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Kootenai County Case No.

)

CR28-2018-8675

)

LEVI

J.

POGUE,

)

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

)

Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
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Has Pogue

abused

its

discretion

Court Abused

Its

Sentencing Discretion

failed to establish that the district court

by denying

his

Rule 35 motion for a reduction 0f sentence?

Pogue Has Failed T0 Establish That The
While “on probation

for

two

District

felonies,”

Pogue drove a

inﬂuence of methamphetamine, ﬂed from police ofﬁcers

stolen vehicle While under the

who were

attempting to stop him, failed

to stop at a stop sign and, ultimately, crashed into another vehicle, seriously injuring the

occupants of that

car.

(Lg,

PSI, pp.1-2, 4, 9-10, 22-30; Tr., p.23, Ls.1-7.)

When officers attempted to detain him, Pogue was “extremely combative”; “[i]t took at least 5
police officers to get control of him” at the scene of the crash, and “[i]t took more than 10”
detention deputies to control him at the jail. (R., pp.14-15.)
The state charged Pogue with felony eluding, possession of a stolen vehicle, aggravated
DUI, misdemeanor obstructing an officer, and a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.48-50.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Pogue pled guilty to aggravated DUI, and the state agreed to
dismiss the remaining charges and the enhancement. (R., pp.51-53, 56-60.) The district court
imposed a unified sentence of 14 years, with 10 years fixed, and ordered the sentence to run
concurrently with Pogue’s sentences in Kootenai County Case numbers CR 2017-5368 (assault
or battery upon certain personnel and theft by receiving, possessing or disposing of stolen
property) and CR 2017-6704 (burglary). (Tr., p.23, Ls.16-22; R., pp.77-78; PSI, p.66.) Pogue
filed a timely Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence, which the district court denied. (R.,
pp.92-101, 108-09.) Pogue filed a notice of appeal timely only from the district court’s order
denying his Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.111-14.)
Pogue argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion
for a reduction of sentence in light of what he characterizes as “the new and additional
information [he] presented in support of the Rule 35 motion.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.6.)

Specifically, he argues that the court should have reduced his sentence because he supported his
motion with a letter in which he “highlighted” the facts that he was taking new medications to
manage his mental health, had found religion, planned to make “positive changes” while
incarcerated, and planned to “parole to Boise” and attend church and support groups upon his
release. (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-8 (citing R., pp.96-98).) He also argues that the court should
have granted his request for leniency in light of his claim that the prosecutor, at sentencing, made
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“incorrect and inappropriate

comments” about

his juvenile history.

(Appellant’s brief, p.6.)

Contrary t0 Pogue’s assertions, a review of the record and of the applicable law shows n0 abuse

of discretion.
In State V. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007), the Idaho

Supreme

Court observed that a Rule 35 motion “does not function as an appeal of a sentence.” The Court
noted that Where a sentence
leniency,

which

is

is

Within statutory limits, a Rule 35 motion

reviewed for an abuse 0f discretion.

motion, the defendant must show that the sentence

I_d.

is

merely a request for

Thus, “[w]hen presenting a Rule 35

excessive in light of

is

new

or additional

information subsequently provided t0 the district court in support 0f the Rule 35 motion.” Li.

Absent the presentation 0f new evidence, “[a]n appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion
cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence.”

Accord

I_d.

State V. Adair, 145

Idaho 514, 516, 181 P.3d 440, 442 (2008).

Pogue did not appeal the judgment 0f conviction
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and plans for release

showed

his sentence
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was

committed additional
case.

left

(Tr., p.32,

rider

As

is

making

was not information

that

and “was 0n probation 0n two separate felonies” when he
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PSI, pp.2-3.)

“two elderly people, the Victims in

That Pogue
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pointed out by the district court at the Rule 35 hearing,

felonies, including the aggravated

Ls.15-19;

The information he

regarding his progress While incarcerated

R., pp.95-98), While technically “new,’

excessive.

Pogue had completed a

letter

in this case.

of Which he was convicted in

The aggravated DUI was extremely

this case,

efforts to rehabilitate

DUI

severely injured.”

While incarcerated

is

not negate the seriousness 0f his crime, the fact that he committed

(Tr., p.32,

serious and

Ls.11-14.)

certainly laudable, but

it

this

it

does

while on supervised release,

or the district court’s determination that the sentence imposed was necessary for “the protection
of society.” (Tr., p.32, Ls.9-21.)
Pogue’s assertion that the prosecutor made “incorrect and inappropriate comments”
about his juvenile history at sentencing was likewise not “new or additional information” that
entitled Pogue to a reduction of sentence. (Appellant’s brief, p.6; R., pp.93-94, 99-101; Tr., p.29,
Ls.8-23.) At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor represented that he had “been dealing with
[Pogue] since he was a little kid,” that he remembered an incident in which Pogue “was in a
stolen car with [Pogue’s] uncle,” and that Pogue’s uncle had “tak[en] the fall” for that offense.
(Tr., p.10, Ls.15-19.) Pogue’s defense counsel responded to the prosecutor’s comments at the
time, advising the court that it was “certainly frustrating when the state begins their statement by
bringing up information that is not listed in the PSI anywhere and attempting to inflame the
Court with charges that are not related to Mr. Pogue.” (Tr., p.14, Ls.10-15.) After entertaining
the parties’ arguments, allowing Pogue to allocute, and indicating it had “reviewed the file …
and the accompanying PSI,” the court concluded in light of the seriousness of the offense and
Pogue’s demonstrated failures to rehabilitate despite prior treatment opportunities and legal
sanctions, that a sentence of 14 years, with 10 years fixed, was necessary to achieve the goals of
sentencing, particularly the protection of society. (Tr., p.20, L.11 – p.23, L.22.)
In support of his Rule 35 motion, Pogue provided the court with the police report of the
incident to which the prosecutor had referred at sentencing. (R., pp.99-101.) Referring to that
report, defense counsel argued at the Rule 35 hearing that, while “Pogue certainly was in the
vehicle with his uncle, … it was with regard to a minor in possession. There was no theft of that
vehicle whatsoever.” (Tr., p.29, Ls.17-20.) Counsel therefore requested that, “to the extent that
argument by [the prosecutor] affected the Court’s decision, we are asking that the Court consider
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that information as mitigation.”

(Tr., p.29, Ls.20-23.)

Responding to defense counsel’s

argument, the district court made clear that the prosecutor’s comments about Pogue’s juvenile
history did not affect the court’s sentencing determination:
The Court did review the file in this matter and remembers the sentencing
in this case. I went back and looked at the minutes to refresh my memory as to
the sentence in this case. And I do recall the prosecutor’s argument in this matter,
and I remember at that time not fully understanding what he was saying in
matching what the prosecutor was saying in some parts and the PSI.
And the Court in this instance listened to the prosecutor, heard his
recommendation, and heard his reasons, but I remember thinking, well, there’s a
lot of stuff that I don’t know about that the prosecutor’s talking about here. And
so I went with what was in the PSI, just taking what the prosecutor said as
argument. And I want that to be clear.
(1/9/19 Tr., p.31, L.19 – p.32, L.8.) Because the court specifically indicated that the prosecutor’s
argument about Pogue’s juvenile history did not affect its sentencing decision, Pogue’s argument
that the court abused its discretion by not reducing his sentence in light of defense counsel’s
clarification of that history is necessarily without merit.
The district court considered all of the information presented to it and concluded, in its
discretion, that none of the information warranted a reduction in Pogue’s sentence. (Tr., p.32,
L.22 – p.33, L.7; R., pp.108-09.) Pogue has failed to establish that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence.
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The

Court to afﬁrm the

state respectfully requests this

district court’s

order denying

Pogue’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.
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